In-Progress
“Educated Guesses and The Principal Principle”
I show that it follows from the guessing approach to accuracy, introduced in Horowitz (2019), that our credences are more accurate if cr(P) > cr(Q) whenever ch(P) > ch(Q). I then show that so long as we adopt a certain set of axioms as rational constraints on our comparative confidence ranking, the standard version of the Principal Principle follows from this result and Villegas’s Theorem, which is a theorem that relates comparative confidence rankings and probability functions. I present reasons for adopting each of the axioms, some of which involve expanding the guessing framework to include new rational constraints on guessing. “Dilating and Contracting non-Arbitrarily”
When we move from precise to imprecise credences without new evidence, we are dilating arbitrarily. When we move from imprecise to precise, we are contracting.
I argue that Horowitz's (2019) guessing framework can (and indeed should) show why dilating and contracting arbitrarily are irrational on accuracy-based grounds. My argument is based on the thought that the guessing framework requires a new approach to guessing with imprecise credences.“Fundamental Laws and the Methodology of Science” co-authored work with Travis McKenna
Looking to analyses of what makes laws fundamental in both science and philosophy of science, we argue that neither discipline has a definition of fundamental law that appropriately captures those laws which are well-suited to tell us about the fundamental structure of reality. “Wavefunction Realism and Fundamentality” co-authored work with Nina Emery
We present a novel version of wavefunction realism, wavefunction non-fundamentalism, that differs from the standard version when it comes to which features of the ontology are fundamental. We argue that comparing the two versions of wavefunction realism will reveal how physicists and philosophers of physics are operating with substantive background assumptions about the nature of fundamentality--and that which interpretation one finds preferable will ultimately depend on their background commitments regarding the nature of fundamentality and connected concepts like supervenience, locality, and explanation.Handouts from Recent Talks
Educated Guesses and the Principal Principle